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Abstract 
Formulating and implementing public policy in Europe has historically been a 
prerogative of national administrations. This paper explores how these prerogatives 
may have become challenged with the ‘autonomization’ of the European Union’s (EU’s) 
foreign affairs administration (The European External Action Service (EEAS)). The 
ambition of this paper is two-fold: First, to assess how independent EEAS personnel are 
when making decisions, thus measuring actor-level autonomy. Secondly, to account for 
actor-level autonomy by applying two key variables in administrative sciences: 
bureaucratic structure and geographical location of administrative systems. Benefiting 
from two new data sets, a survey and elite interviews of EEAS officials, two empirical 
observations are highlighted. First, EEAS officials demonstrate considerable behavioural 
independence even against attempts from member-state governments to restrain this. 
Secondly, the behavioural autonomy of EEAS staff is explained primarily with reference to 
the supply of organizational capacities inside the EEAS and less by the geographical location 
of staff. Thus, the bureaucratic structure of the EEAS serves to safeguard bureaucratic 
autonomy in EU’s new foreign affairs administration. By comparison, the geographical 
location of EEAS staff is a relatively weak, albeit not absent, signifier of behavioural 
autonomy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
Formulating and implementing public policy in Europe has historically been a 
prerogative of national administrations. The capacity of the state has largely been 
determined by ‘the [administrative] capacity of the state to effectively achieve the 
chosen policy outcomes’ (Matthews 2012: 281). This paper explores how these 
prerogatives may have become challenged with the rise administrative capacities within 
the European Union (EU) institutions. One critical test thereof is the rise of 
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administrative capacities in EU’s foreign affairs administrations, which historically have 
been subject to relatively tight state control (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). Essential 
is the extent to which ‘European level’ administrative capacities in foreign affairs 
administration build organisational structures that enable office holders to act relatively 
independently from key components of an inherent Westphalian administrative order 
(Madison 1788). A European public administration in foreign affairs may serve to create 
an institutional infrastructure for the joint formulation and execution of a common 
European foreign policy and strengthen its capability to draw common lessons from 
experience at a ‘European level’. Administrative capacity building in this regard at EU 
level may also strengthen its capacity to integrate domestic non-majoritarian 
institutions as part of the centre, thus integrating foreign affairs administrations in 
Europe across levels of government. One hard test of the establishment of independent 
administrative capacities in a European context is the European External Action Service 
(EEAS), where the core-state powers of foreign and defense policies are uploaded to the 
EU level (Henökl 2014). The ambition of this paper is two-fold: 
- The first ambition is to assess how independent EEAS personnel are when making 
decisions, thus measuring actor-level autonomy within EU’s new foreign affairs 
administration (see below). 
- The second ambition is to account for actor-level autonomy by applying two key 
variables in administrative sciences: bureaucratic structure and geographical location 
of administrative systems (see below).  
 
The power of international organizations (IOs) is to a large extent supplied by the autonomy 
of its bureaucratic arm, that is, by the ability of international bureaucracies – and their staff 
– to act relatively independently of mandates and decision premises from member-state 
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(MS) governments (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Biermann and Siebenhüner 2013; Cox and 
Jacobson 1973; Fukuyama 2013: 11; Reinalda 2013). As an area of research, the extent to 
which and the conditions under which international bureaucracies may act independently of 
MS governments has become increasingly vibrant, however, still offering inconclusive 
findings (e.g. Beyers 2010; Checkel 2007; Moravcsik 1999). This paper contributes to fill this 
void. This study thus speaks to a wider literature on the autonomy of international 
bureaucracies (e.g. Ege and Bauer 2013; Trondal 2013). One essential question arises when 
studying bureaucratic autonomy: ‘independent of whom?’ (Shapiro 1997: 278). To begin 
with, it is too simplistic to assume a priori from which institutions international 
bureaucracies such as the EEAS are supposed to be independent (Kelemen 2005: 174). 
In this study, autonomy concerns the relationship vis-à-vis MS governments. This 
relationship is essential to study in order to examine transformation of the inherent 
Westphalian administrative order. The second question is: how can we accurately 
measure autonomy? The concept of bureaucratic autonomy is not neatly defined in 
literature (Kelemen 2005: 174; Verschuere 2006). A working definition applied is that 
‘autonomy is about discretion, or the extent to which [an organization] can decide itself 
about matters that it considers important’ (Verhoest et al. 2010: 18-19). Whereas most 
literature on the autonomy of international bureaucracies assesses autonomy by 
considering their de jure formal-legal design (e.g. Gilardi 2008; Hammond and Knott; 
1996; Huber and Shipan 2002; Maor 2007: 5), far less attention has been devoted to 
studying the de facto real-life autonomy of international bureaucracies. This paper 
examines the de facto ‘real-life’ autonomy of the EEAS by assessing actor-level variables, 
i.e. the decision-making behaviour, role perceptions and institutional allegiances of the 
EEAS personnel (Trondal 2010: 147). The autonomy of the EEAS is thus assessed by the 
behavioural perceptions reported by EEAS officials. 
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The EEAS remains under-utilized as an analytical laboratory in EU studies, political science, 
public administration and organisation studies.2 First, in the study of public administration it 
represents a hard test of bureaucratic autonomy since the EEAS has only recently (2010) 
entered an institutional field coined by intrinsic national stronghold. Secondly, in 
organizational studies it represents a hard test on the effect of organizational structures on 
administrative behaviour since EEAS officials have only recently been recruited. It is 
conceivable that the influence of previous organizational affiliations is still present 
among the staff (see the next section). Thirdly, it is a ‘new kid on the block’ in political 
science and EU studies (Blom and Vanhoonacker 2014) and currently subject to scholarly 
dispute as to the ‘nature of the beast’ (Bàtora 2013; Blockmans and Hillion 2013: 8; Blom 
and Vanhoonacker 2014). Fourthly, it is a methodologically rich case since it represents a 
full-fledged bureaucratic structure available for study. The EEAS is an intriguing case, since 
it acts as the EU’s centralized foreign and security policy apparatus, responsible for 
designing and implementing the Union’s external action, and maintaining diplomatic 
relations with the rest of the world. It is a fully-fledged bureaucratic hybrid, comprising 
a wide range of structures from foreign aid and development to international crisis 
management and defense units, staffed by officials of both national and supra-national 
organizational provenance. Finally, the EEAS is a useful case to gauge the impact of 
geographical location of administrative systems since the EEAS features two geographical 
locations: one head-quarter in Brussels and several delegations scattered around the globe 
(139 in total (2013)). The EEAS combines personnel originating from two main sources, 
comprising roughly 60 per cent of its staff from former EU institutions (mainly 
Commission DG RELEX and the Secretariat General of the Council, SGC) and about one 
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third of seconded national diplomats (SND) from the MSs’ ministries of foreign affairs 
(MFA). This paper analyses behaviour autonomy of all three categories of EEAS officials.  
 
Profiting from two new data sets, two empirical observations are highlighted. First, EEAS 
officials demonstrate considerable behavioural independence even against attempts from 
MS governments to restrain this. EEAS officials are primarily ‘inward-looking’ abiding 
formal roles and rules of the EEAS. This observation supports a vast body of literature 
showing that European Commission (Commission) officials evoke classic (Weberian) 
civil service ethos such as neutrality and technical expertise on the one hand, and 
‘communautarian’ ideals of the future of Europeans polity on the other (e.g. Coombes 
1970; Michelmann 1978; Page 1997; Ellinas and Suleiman 2012; Kassim et al. 2013). 
Secondly, the behavioural autonomy of EEAS staff is explained primarily with reference to 
the supply of organizational capacities inside the EEAS and less by the geographical location 
of staff. The bureaucratic structure of the EEAS serves to safeguard bureaucratic autonomy 
in EU’s new foreign affairs administration. By comparison, the geographical location of EEAS 
staff is a weaker, albeit not absent, signifier of their behavioural autonomy. There is a 
tendency that officials located geographically closer to the executive center (Brussels) 
perceive themselves to be slightly more independent than officials placed at longer distance 
(at EU delegations around the world). 
 
The paper is presented in the following steps. The next section offers a theoretical departure 
outlining two sets of independent variables: Organizational affiliation and geographical 
location. The subsequent two steps present the data and methodology underlying the study 
as well as the empirical observations. The final step of the study offers a conclusion and a 
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discussion of what lessons can be drawn in the study of administrative systems and 
theoretically on the relative effects of organizational affiliation and geographical location.  
 
A theoretical departure 
On organisational affiliation 
An organisational approach suggests that the supply of organisational capacities might 
have certain implications for how organisations and humans act. This approach assumes 
that organizational capacity-building supply government institutions with leverage to 
act independently and to integrate external institutions into its orbit (Egeberg 2012; 
Olsen 2010; Trondal 2010). This approach departs from the assumption that 
organisational structures mobilize biases in public policy because organizational rules 
and routines supply cognitive and normative shortcuts and categories that simplify and 
guide decision-makers’ behaviour (Schattschneider 1975; Simon 1957). Concomitantly, 
one initial empirical prediction is that the supply of independent administrative 
capacities is necessary for government institutions to act. In effect, the establishment of 
independent administrative capacities inside the EEAS is expected to increase the 
likelihood that decision-making premises (from vague signals to detailed mandates) 
sent from the EEAS organisation will be ascribed importance by EEAS staff. Accordingly, 
the decision-making behaviour of ‘Eurocrats’ in a European administrative system is 
likely to reflect their primary organizational affiliations at any time. 
 
Office holders in modern governments tend to occupy multiple organisational 
affiliations, some of which are primary and some of which are secondary. However, the 
bounded rationality of humans reduces their capacity to attend to more than one 
affiliation at a time (Simon 1957). The logic of primacy implies that the primary 
affiliations of civil servants are expected to bias their behavioural patterns more 
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extensively than secondary affiliations (Egeberg 2006). Arguably, primary affiliations 
create salient behaviour and roles whereas secondary affiliations create less salient 
repertoires of behaviour for actors (Ashford and Mael 2004: 141). Following from this, 
the behaviour, role and identity perceptions evoked by EEAS officials are expected to be 
primarily directed towards those administrative units that are the primary supplier of 
relevant decision premises. Because officials spend most of their time and energy in 
organizational sub-units of primary organisations (Whyte 1956: 47), they may be 
expected to chiefly attend to their sub-unit and less towards organizations as wholes 
(Ashford and Johnson 2001: 36). Subsequently, EEAS personnel are likely to orient their 
behaviour towards their present EEAS units rather than to the concerns of MS 
governments – or even the EU system as a whole. They are expected to evoke an 
‘inward-looking’ behavioural pattern geared towards their ‘own’ sub-units and task 
environments. We may expect that EEAS officials evoke Weberian virtues of party-
political neutrality, attaching identity towards their unit, division and portfolio, and 
attending chiefly to administrative rules and proper procedures of their primary 
organisational affiliation (Richards and Smith 2004). The following proposition may 
thus be derived:  
 
Hypothesis 1: It is expected that EEAS officials’ behavioural attention is primarily 
directed inwards, towards their own institution, unit and division, and only secondarily 
towards other institutions, such as MS governments. In short, their primary 
organisational affiliation towards the EEAS is expected to be a primary supplier of 
relevant decision-making premises. Concomitantly, former organisational affiliations 
(such as prior careers in MS governments and/or the Council Secretariat) will be of 
secondary importance in this regard. 
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On geographical location 
Compared to the organisational dimension, the spatial dimension has been largely 
neglected in studies of public sector organisations. Although an old topic of 
administrative sciences (e.g. Gulick 1937), in the study of state building, party formation 
and voting behaviour (Rokkan and Urwin 1982), as well as the symbolic meaning of 
architecture (Goodsell 1977), the effects of place or site has been largely ignored in 
public administration scholarship (although see Egeberg and Trondal 2011). This paper 
contributes to fill this void. The absence of a spatial dimension in the literature on the 
effects of agencification is puzzling since practitioners sometimes justify often highly 
contested relocations by arguing that physical distance might serve to underpin the 
intended autonomy of agencies from political executives. The geographical dispersion of 
government institutions has indeed been considered an instrument of administrative 
policy (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). Of importance to this study, the Commission sees 
geographical dispersion of Community institutions as part of its administrative policy. 
With particular reference to the geographical localization of EU agencies, the 
Commission has argued that,  
 
’the fact that regulatory agencies are spread around the EU, whilst executive 
agencies are housed in Brussels or Luxembourg, is just the most obvious symbol 
of their very different relationship with the Commission’ (European Commission 
2008: 3). ‘The Commission also feels that the agency’s [geographical] seat is a 
constituent element of the basic act and should therefore be included in it’ 
(European Commission 2005: 4; see also Szapiro 2005: 3). 
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Face-to-face contacts appear in general to be highly appreciated when critical decisions 
are made in organizations (Jablin 1987: 394). This has particularly been emphasized in 
international bi- and multilateral diplomacy. The establishment of diplomatic missions 
in close proximity to other states has been considered instrumental in gaining influence 
and friendship. Jönsson et al. (2000: 186) argue that processes involving considerable 
uncertainty, unpredictability and surprise – as often happens in foreign policy-making 
and diplomacy - require information exchange via face-to-face contacts and group 
conversation. A previous study among government officials revealed that a majority 
deem face-to-face contact in formal meetings to be important for carrying out their daily 
tasks while other face-to-face contacts are emphasized slightly less (Egeberg 1994). 
Such decision-making through face-to face-interaction presupposes a common site 
(Therborn 2006). In addition, it can be held that ‘place is the forming mould of actors’, 
and has a bearing on bureaucrats socialization (Therborn 2006: 512). Thus, such 
interaction might be sensitive to the physical arrangement of organizations and to 
physical distances. The following proposition may thus be derived: 
 
Hypothesis 2: It is expected that EEAS officials who are physically located at the EEAS 
head-quarter in Brussels direct their behavioural attention foremost towards EU-level 
institutions in general, and to the EEAS in particular. Thus, headquarter officials at the 
EEAS are more likely to assume greater behavioural independence from MS 
governments than EEAS officials located at the delegations far away from Brussels. The 
latter are expected to direct their behavioural attention comparatively more outwards 
towards outside institutions – such as MS governments. Concomitantly, geographical 
proximity to Brussels is conducive to behavioural autonomy among EEAS officials. 
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Data and method 
The empirical observations benefit from two separate data sets, one online survey and 
one interview study. In 2013 we distributed a link with an invitation to 617 AD level 
officials of the EEAS to participate in an online survey. After two reminders accompanied 
by physical distribution of some 70 paper questionnaires to officials in Brussels, the 
survey harvested a total number of 184 responses, of these were 148 completed 
questionnaires and 36 partially completed ones.3 For our sample of 680 eligible 
respondents the response rate is thus close to 30 per cent. Compared to previous large-
scale surveys of the Commission (notably Kassim et al. 2013), this response rate is 
reasonable. Moreover, the data is satisfactorily representative with respect to officials’ 
previous affiliation, geographical balance (country of origin)4, place of assignment, 
educational background, as well as age and gender. 74 of the officials in our survey (41 
per cent) were recruited (transferred) from DG RELEX, 19 respondents (11 per cent) 
from the Council Secretariat General (SGC), and 24 respondents (13 per cent) from MSs’ 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 22 per cent of the respondents were working for 
other Commission DGs before 2011.5 
 
Not surprisingly the data shows that the EEAS has a highly educated workforce, with the 
large majority (63 per cent) of the surveyed EEAS officials having at least MA-level 
university education, and some 17 per cent have obtained a PhD-level degree. 
Respondents who ticked ‘other’ in the survey indicated some form of ‘post-graduate 
diploma’, ‘police-‘ or ‘military academy’, ‘engineering’ and diverse forms of national 
diplomas. As for gender, the survey shows an unequal distribution between male and 
female officials (67 vs. 32 per cent of the respondents who chose to disclose this 
information). However this corresponds to the gender distribution among the general 
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EEAS population in AD positions with 71 per cent men and 29 per cent women in all AD-
level positions6 and therefore depicts quite accurately the ratio of male and female EEAS 
officials. The same is true for age. The survey confirms the overall EEAS pattern of a 
comparatively ‘old’ or aging EEAS population with more than 40 per cent over the age of 
50.  
 
Table 1 Distribution of organisational affiliations among EEAS 
staff in our survey (per cent) 
 Previous affiliation  Present affiliation  
EEAS - 75 
Council Secretariat 
General (SGC) 
11 - 
COM DG RELEX 41 -  
COM DEVCO -   13 
COM DG AIDCO 8  - 
COM DG ELARG 1 2 
COM DG TRADE 1 2 
COM DG DEV 12 - 
MS MFA 13 2 
European Parliament (EP) 1 1 
Other 12 5 
N 180 184 
 
 
 
Regarding institutional provenance, the survey has a bias for former RELEX officials (41 
per cent of respondents), which in spite of active recruitment of MS diplomats (Murdoch 
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et al. 2013) still – three years after its creation - dominates the EEAS population. Next, 
the survey features an almost equal distribution of staff at the EEAS head-quarter (HQ) 
in Brussels (52 per cent) and officials posted in delegations (DELs) around the globe (47 
per cent). Three respondents did not specify their place of assignment. Within the two 
populations the distribution is balanced with regard to staff category, level of tasks and 
gender. It is less balanced for previous affiliation, which has a slight selection bias in 
favour of previous Commission staff, which however reflects also the overall picture of 
EEAS staff (approximately 1/3 of staff coming from MSs’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs 
(MFAs)), as well as an overrepresentation of AD officials, which is intended since the 
survey focusses on EEAS decision-makers (see Appendix 2). With regard to 
organizational affiliation and place assignment, one reservation needs to be made. Since 
the questionnaire was distributed to staff in EU delegations, based on the organograms 
of the EU delegation’s websites, the survey also includes a number of 30 officials, 
working at EU delegations and having EEAS e-mail addresses, but formally depending on 
their Commission DGs (DEVCO, TRADE, ELARG, Environment).  
 
Table 2 Distribution of officials according to geographical location, by previous 
affiliation, staff category, task level, and gender 
 
 
HQ DELs  
Per cent 
(Frequencies) 
Per cent 
(Frequencies) 
N 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 
P
ro
v
en
an
ce
 Previously Commission 66 (52) 80 (73) 
167 Previously Council and/or 
MFA 
34 (27) 21 (15) 
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S
ta
ff
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 
AD 62 (55) 68 (50) 
164 
AST 18 (16) 13 (10) 
SND 10 (9) 15 (11) 
SNE 3 (3) 4 (3) 
AC 7 (6) 1 (1) 
T
as
k
 l
ev
el
 
Political/ diplomatic 56 (50) 56 (44) 
169 Administrative/managerial  42 (38) 41 (32) 
Operational/ technical 2 (2) 4 (3) 
G
en
d
er
 Female 31 (25) 32 (20) 
143 
Male  68 (56) 67 (42) 
 
Mean N 
52  
(85) 
47  
(76) 
100 
(161) 
 
 
In addition to this survey data, between 2011 and 2013 a total number of 46 semi-
structured in-depth interviews were conducted with mainly EEAS and Commission 
foreign policy-makers, as well as some officials from the Council Secretariat General and 
MS MFAs. An overview of the distribution with regard to nationality of these interview 
partners is provided by Appendix 1 - Table A.1 (column 3). These interviews were 
conducted partly to collect data on the functioning of the EEAS and partly to prepare the 
ground for the questionnaire conducted thereafter. The interviews were guided by an 
interview guide and subsequently transcribed.  
 
Results 
This section presents the main findings from the survey and interview data as regards 
some core dimensions of the behavioural autonomy of EEAS officials. Behavioural 
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dimensions that are assessed include nature and level of tasks, attitudes and role 
perceptions, contact patterns, cleavages of conflicts within the organization, and 
concerns and signals deemed important when doing their work. On each of these 
dimensions, we show how primary organisational affiliation and geographical location 
(at the HQ and the DELs, respectively) make a difference in these regards. When 
interpreting results, emphasis is primarily attached to consistent patterns across tables. 
As seen in Table 2 a majority of EEAS officials find themselves involved in diplomatic, 
political, managerial and/or administrative tasks. Only a minority report being mainly 
occupied with ‘operational’ and/or ‘technical’ tasks. The latter category of staff is left out 
from the subsequent analysis (see Appendix 2).  
 
One proxy of behavioural autonomy is the loyalty perceptions and ‘sense of belonging’ 
emphasised by office holders. Table 3 (below) measure this by comparing officials’ 
adherence to ‘rules for conflict of interests and loyalties’ for those originating from the 
Commission (‘supranational recruitment’) and those originating from the Council 
Secretariat General or MSs’ MFA (‘intergovernmental (IG) recruitment’). Four patterns 
are evident: First, EEAS officials evoke a multiple set of identify perceptions. Secondly, 
current organisational affiliation is clearly the dominant trigger of officials’ sense of 
belonging. Different recruitment routs show hardly any effect in this regard. Moreover, 
that ‘rules and standards for EU agencies’ score relatively lower, suggests that the EEAS 
is perceived primarily as part of the core-executive of the EU, and not as an EU agency. 
Thirdly, previous organisational affiliations (rules of previous institution) are indeed 
shown to be important, although far less than current organisational affiliation. Finally, 
geographical location of EEAS officials matters somewhat. Staff at the delegations are 
relatively more attached to the rules of previous institutional affiliations compared to 
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officials at the Brussels HQ. By contrast, the hierarchical superior seems to a larger 
extent to be a first stop on issues of conflicts of interests or loyalty at the Brussels HQ 
than at DELs. In both cases the ‘national coordinator’ does not play an important role. In 
sum, EEAS officials are ‘multi-hatted’ but their primary affiliation at the EEAS is 
uppermost among these. Although for former Commission officials the rules of their 
former organizational affiliation are slightly more important than for MS and SGC 
recruits, both populations attach most importance to their present affiliation.  
 
 
Table 3 Per cent officials (very or somewhat) strongly emphasising the following 
rules for conflict of interest and loyalties, by geographic location and source of 
recruitment (Mean N=124) 
 
HEADQUARTER 
(N=67) 
DELEGATIONS 
(N=57) 
 
Sources of recruitment: 
IG recruits 
(N=23) 
Supranation
al recruits 
(N=44) 
IG recruits 
(N= 10) 
Supranatio
nal recruits 
(=47) 
Rules of previous institution 61 65 60 95 
Rules of present institution 100 100 100 95 
Staff regulations 93 100 80 95 
Code of conduct for the civil service 91 95 90 94 
Rules of EU agencies 50 44 80 45 
Supervisor 95 94 90 89 
National coordinator 36 n.a. 30 n.a. 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ 
(value 3), ‘less important’ (value 4), ‘not important at all’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6).  
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Next, zooming in on officials’ contact patterns, two observations become apparent (see 
Table 4): First, as expected, most respondents indicate that their main contacts are 
within their primary organisational affiliation at the EEAS - within their division and 
department (intra-organisationally), and secondly towards other administrative units at 
the EEAS (inter-organisationally). This pattern clearly reflects the current organizational 
affiliation of EEAS officials – both vertically and horizontally within the EEAS apparatus. 
As expected, frequency of contact decreases proportionally with the level of hierarchy: 
80 per cent have ‘(very) frequent’ contacts to their Head of Division, 43 per cent with 
their Director, and only 11 per cent indicates ‘(very) frequent’ contacts with their 
Commissioner/political head of their entity. With regards to the latter, the majority of 
respondents report ‘rarely’ or ‘almost never’.  
 
In spite of the highly formalized character of diplomatic relations, some degree of 
behavioural spontaneity is a prerequisite for the existence of policy-making discretion. 
An overwhelming majority reports that e-mail is the most important form of 
communication, followed by ‘informal face-to-face meetings’, and then, on third place, 
‘formal face-to-face meetings’. ‘Spontaneous encounters’ are considered ‘important’ or 
‘very important’ to more than one third of officials, suggesting the presence of 
behavioural discretion among EEAS officials. 
 
Secondly, the geographical location of officials affects their contact behaviour. As 
predicted, officials at the HQ in Brussels have more intra-organisational contacts inside 
the EEAS whereas officials at the DELs around the world have a more outreach contact 
pattern – towards MS institutions and third countries’ authorities. Moreover, whereas 
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officials at EU delegations have slightly less contacts within their own organization than 
their colleagues at HQ, increasingly this is evident when moving up the EEAS hierarchy. 
This observation confirms our expectations that delegations generally operate 
somewhat closer to MS governments. However, the fact that they also maintain 
significantly more contacts with their domestic ministries and agencies of origin, 
however, does not have to be interpreted as being under the control from their MS. 
According to interview data (e.g. #24, #31, #38), it also has to do with the role of the 
new EU delegations organizing, chairing and hosting meetings of the Heads of Missions, 
Heads of Sections and the other work groups at the lower diplomatic echelons. This also 
transpires from comparing the figures of frequent contacts with ‘own’ domestic 
ministries (41 per cent) and ministries of other EU MS (49 per cent), which may be 
considered as reasonably balanced. One HoD describes this involvement with the EU-MS 
as follows:  
 
“Already now I spend more than 60 per cent of my time with internal 
coordination [among EU MS]. The EU representation office has an entire floor 
with meeting rooms and we host about 1000 coordination meetings with the MS 
at diverse diplomatic and working levels” (Interview #31, authors’ translation).  
 
In sum, sharing the Brussels site supports the behavioural autonomy among HQ staff. 
 
Table 4 Per cent officials reporting the following contacts (Total N=157) 
 HQ (N= 82) DELs (N=75) 
 (Very) Occasionally Rarely/ (Very) Occasionally Rarely/ 
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frequently almost 
never 
frequently almost 
never 
Contacts within 
own organization 
(EEAS) 
 
46 
 
36 
 
18 
 
31 
 
52 
 
18 
Colleagues within 
own unit/division 
(EEAS) 
 
95 
 
5 
 
0 
 
94 
 
4 
 
1 
Head of 
unit/division 
(EEAS) 
 
84 
 
13 
 
2 
 
75 
 
15 
 
9 
Director (EEAS) 51 32 17 33 26 41 
Other departments 
 (EEAS) 
 
67 
 
26 
 
7 
 
58 
 
23 
 
19 
Other EU 
institutions 
53 34 13 31 26 33 
Commissioner 9 9 83 13 6 81 
Ministries/agencies 
from officials’ own 
country of origin 
 
 
12 
 
 
37 
 
 
51 
 
 
41 
 
 
28 
 
 
21 
Ministries/agencies 
of other EU MS 
 
27 
 
30 
 
43 
 
49 
 
25 
 
26 
Ministries/agencies 
of third countries 
 
21 
 
27 
 
53 
 
67 
 
15 
 
19 
20 
 
Original code list: ‘Very frequently’ (value 1), ‘frequently’ (value 2), ‘occasionally’ (value 3), ‘rarely’ (value 4), 
‘(almost) never’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
 
 
Next, when asked how important different considerations and concerns are in the work 
of EEAS staff, two patterns are manifesting (Table 5). First, most emphasis is put on the 
concerns of the primary organisational affiliation of EEAS officials. Equally among HQ 
and DEL staff, the EEAS is viewed as an intergovernmental ‘free-zone’ since EEAS 
officials attach almost no importance to the concerns of their country of origin. Rather, 
most EEAS officials emphasise the concerns of the EU. Secondly, the geographical 
location of EEAS staff has no significant effects on their emphasis on various 
considerations and concerns. The concerns and considerations deemed important as 
well as the importance given to political signals (see Table 6) seems to be fairly balanced 
at HQ and at delegations, with some notable exceptions. First, both the Commission and 
the EP are ranked higher at delegations than at HQ. In contrast, the influence of MSs (in 
order of their relative weight from ‘big’ to ‘medium-sized’ to smaller MSs) is more 
strongly felt in Brussels than at delegations.  
 
Table 5 Per cent officials emphasising the following considerations and concerns 
(Total N= 151) 
 HQ (N= 78) DELs (N=73) 
 
(Very) 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
(Very) 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Political concerns 79 9 86 8 
Diplomatic concerns 89 10 88 5 
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Interest of unit/division (EEAS) 81 15 80 15 
Interest of DG/service (EEAS) 80 15 81 14 
Interest of the EU 91 6 97 2 
Interest of own MS 11 6 12 16 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important at all’ (value 5), ‘can’s say’ (value 6). 
 
Next, EEAS officials were asked to report the relative importance they assign to various 
political signals. Table 6 shows that they emphasise a multiple set of signals – primarily 
towards the core institutional triangle of the Commission, the EP and the Council. This 
suggests that the EEAS is not a service in ‘splendid isolation’ (Bauer 2009: 469). EEAS 
officials are indeed politically attentive. Also, the effect of their primary affiliation is 
highlighted by the impact of the direct hierarchy inside the EEAS. Beyond a clear 
emphasis put on signals from EU-level institutions, an interesting observation concerns 
the relative importance that is given to the EP. This is an observation that is also shared 
by Commission officials reported in a recent study (Ellinas and Suleiman 2012). 
Furthermore, in spite of the limited direct contacts of the survey respondents with the 
political level of the EEAS (see Table 4), a fair amount of attention is indeed paid to the 
signals from the leadership level of the EEAS. This observation supports the assumption 
that the EEAS – much like the Commission – is an organization driven by an internal 
‘logic of hierarchy’ (Trondal et al. 2010). This assumption is also confirmed by the 
importance assigned to signals from respondents’ ‘hierarchical superior or line 
management’. Taken together, these observations provide evidence of how primary 
organisational affiliations with the EEAS nurture behavioural autonomy among staff. By 
contrast, the geographical location of EEAS officials does not have a significant pattern of 
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effects, other than that (up to 20 per cent) more attention is paid to MS concerns at the 
HQ, whereas more importance (roughly 15 per cent) is given to central level EU 
institutions at DELs. 
 
Table 6 Per cent officials emphasising the following political signals (Total N=149) 
 HQ (N=77) DELs (72) 
 
(Very) 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Less/not 
important 
(Very) 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Less/not 
important 
European 
Council 
 
76 
 
22 
 
3 
 
80 
 
11 
 
9 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Council 
 
82 
 
14 
 
4 
 
74 
 
15 
 
11 
European 
Commission 
 
75 
 
20 
 
5 
 
90 
 
2 
 
9 
European 
Parliament 
 
60 
 
27 
 
12 
 
72 
 
16 
 
12 
‘Big’ MS 65 20 15 48 21 30 
‘Medium-
sized’ MS 
 
41 
 
38 
 
21 
 
25 
 
43 
 
32 
‘Small’ MS 30 43 27 18 39 34 
Domestic 
Governments 
 
23 
 
12 
 
65 
 
14 
 
21 
 
64 
Political level/ 
senior 
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management 92 7 1 91 3 5 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important at all’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
 
Next, patterns of conflict and cooperation are an important proxy of decision-making 
dynamics within and between government institutions. First, conflicts can be measured 
on a scale assessing the level of conflict. Of greater importance here is what patterns of 
conflicts are discernible. Essentially, bureaucratic autonomy in the EU’s foreign affairs 
administration would lead us to expect the emergence of conflicts – as perceived by staff 
– that are either non-territorial and/or multidimensional. By contrast, a one-
dimensional cleavage structure that is essentially territorial would reflect an inherent 
Westphalian conflict structure and a subsequent lack of bureaucratic autonomy at the 
EU level (Rokkan 1999: 149).  
 
Table 7 shows that the EEAS exhibits both non-territorial and multidimensional conflict 
patterns among staff. Perceptions of most important conflicts are horizontally patterned 
within the various EEAS sub-units and vertically across levels of hierarchy inside the 
EEAS. This multi-dimensional and largely non-territorial conflict structure also involves 
inter-institutional conflicts between the EEAS and other EU institutions. Moreover, we 
find little variation between the HQ and DELs in this regard. However, one difference is 
salient: While hierarchical and sectoral conflicts seem to be slightly higher at HQ, all 
other types of cleavages are more strongly emphasized by DEL officials. Cleavages 
between different staff categories at delegations would include conflict between 
permanent and temporary personnel, and between staff from different former 
affiliations. Sectoral cleavages comprise conflicts between officials from civil and 
military units of the EEAS, etc. Moreover, territorial patterns of conflict are hardly 
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emphasised by EEAS personnel (‘conflicts with MS administrations’, ‘conflicts between 
“big”, “medium-sized” and “small” MSs’ or ‘”old” and “new” EU MSs’). Table 7 thus clearly 
shows that conflict patterns among EEAS officials are primarily moulded by their 
current organisational affiliation inside the EEAS.  
 
 
Table 7 Per cent officials emphasising the following patterns of conflict (Mean N= 
149) 
 HQ DELs 
 (Very or 
somewhat) 
important 
N 
(100%) 
(Very) 
important 
 
N 
(100%) 
Hierarchical conflicts 81 73 76 67 
Sectoral conflicts 88 72 82 58 
Conflicts between former Commission 
staff and former SNDs 
 
61 
 
64 
 
72 
 
60 
Conflicts between former Commission 
staff and former SGC staff 
 
53 
 
63 
 
64 
 
59 
Conflicts between big and small MS 32 66 27 61 
Conflicts between new and old MS 38 66 1 62 
Conflicts between EU institutions 78 71 80 67 
Conflicts with MS administrations 51 64 49 60 
Original code list: ‘Very important’ (value 1), ‘important’ (value 2), ‘somewhat important’ (value 3), ‘less 
important’ (value 4), ‘not important at all’ (value 5), ‘can’t say’ (value 6). 
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Finally, officials were asked whether, compared to their experiences before the launch of 
the EEAS, they had faced profound changes in their work situation. Our data, however 
not reported in figures, shows that the formation of the EEAS introduced – at least 
during the early stages of the new organization – an element of opacity for officials 
regarding their roles and instructions, lines of reporting, and especially as regards 
organizational goals and strategy. Secondly, perceived changes also involve more 
‘political exposure’ and ‘political interferences’, but also changes as regards ‘clarity of 
one’s own role and function’, ‘clarity of reporting lines’, and ‘clarity of organizational 
goals and strategy’. Officials also report, not surprisingly, increased ‘workload’ and 
‘administrative burden’. Especially the latter was reported by nearly two thirds of 
respondents. On the other hand, contacts have also increased between staff inside as 
well as outside their own organization (see also Table 4). 
 
Conclusions 
Formulating and implementing public policy in Europe has historically been a 
prerogative of national administrations. This paper has examined how these 
prerogatives have become challenged with the rise of administrative capacities within 
the EU’s new foreign affairs administration. The ambition of this study has been to 
empirically assess how independent EEAS personnel are when making decisions and 
theoretically to explain variation in actor-level autonomy by the bureaucratic structure 
of the EEAS administration and the geographical location of EEAS staff.  
 
The survey and interview data reported above highlights two important findings. First, 
EEAS officials demonstrate considerable behavioural independence. EEAS officials are 
primarily inward-looking officials abiding core roles and rules of the EEAS. This 
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observation supports a vast body of literature showing that Commission officials evoke 
classic (Weberian) civil service ethos such as neutrality and technical expertise on the 
one hand, and communitarian ideals of the future of Europeans polity on the other 
(Kassim et al. 2013). The EEAS thus operates much like the EU’s core-executive 
institution. Secondly, the behavioural autonomy among EEAS staff is explained primarily 
with reference to the supply of organizational capacities inside the EEAS and only 
secondarily by the geographical location of staff. In short, the primary organisational 
affiliation of EEAS officials seems to bias their behavioural discretion towards 
independence vis-à-vis MS governments. This finding also supports previous research 
(e.g. Egeberg 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 2011; Trondal 2013).  
 
In sum, the bureaucratic structure of the EEAS serves to safeguard bureaucratic 
autonomy in EU’s new foreign affairs administration. The geographical location of EEAS 
staff is a considerable weaker but nevertheless non-negligible signifier of their 
behavioural autonomy. This finding complements and nuances previous studies of 
bureaucratic geography. A large-N elite survey of the Norwegian central administration 
showed that agency autonomy, agency influence and inter-institutional coordination 
seemed to be relatively unaffected by the geographical location of agencies (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2011). Agencification seems in practice fairly often accompanied by 
geographical relocation away from the national capital or, in the case of the EU, from 
Brussels to places outside Belgium.  This geographical dispersion of institutions, 
however, leaves few significant effects on the daily work of these institutions. However, 
with regard to the EEAS, essentially a diplomatic service with its own tradition of 
disposing a network of representation offices all over the world, the effects of location 
deserves dedicated attention of future research. 
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Notes 
 
                                                        
1
 This paper is financially supported by the COMPOL Project (‘The Rise of Common 
Political Order’ – Basic Research Grant). A previous version of the paper was presented at the 
Norwegian Political Science Conference in Tromsø, 2014. The authors acknowledge the 
valuable comments from all workshop participants.  
2 There is indeed a mounting ‘EEAS literature’. However, as with most literature on new 
institutions, it exhibits certain biases. Much of the nascent EEAS literature exhibits a bias 
towards assessing how the new ‘service’ ought to be organized to make the EU a 
coherent actor on the global stage (e.g. Bátora 2011, 2013; Carta 2011; Furness 2012; 
Nivet 2011). Some recent studies, however, offer ‘positive’ analyses of the EEAS, for 
example by examining its initial formation (Murdoch 2012, Morgenstern 2013), 
exploring the roles of its officials (Benson-Rea and Shore 2012; Duke et al. 2012; Juncos 
and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker et al. 2012), and 
its promise for the coherence, symbol and legitimacy of EU foreign policy (Adler-Nissen 
2014; Duke 2012; Raube 2012; Furness 2013; Smith 2013; Wisniewski 2013).  
3
 As completed questionnaires were counted responses that answered all content-related 
questions throughout the survey and at least partially the demographic questions at the end of 
the survey (MS of origin, education, sex and age). Since, in principle, all content-questions 
were mandatory to reply to in order to get through and to the end of the survey, missing data 
in the completed questionnaires is rather limited (‘in principle’ because, in the case of one 
question the ‘mandatory-to-reply’ feature was not activated, neither is it applicable to the 
paper questionnaires that were returned by mail.) 
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4 The survey gathered officials from 23 EU MS, with countries most strongly represented 
being: Germany (22 responses), Belgium (14), Italy (13), France (12), the Netherlands 
(10) and the UK (9). 17 respondents did not disclose their country of origin. Among the 
respondents, German nationals are somewhat overrepresented in relation to the total 
number of German EEAS officials (126 officials: 84 AD and 42 AST), as are the 
Netherlands (10 respondents compared to 55 Dutch EEAS officials in total, 20 AD and 25 
AST). Belgium, although a small MS, is strongly represented in our survey as well as in 
the EEAS (226 officials: 60 AD and 166 AST), whereas Spain and Poland (5 and 4 
respondents, respectively) score somewhat below their weight in terms of 
organizational population (Spain: 122 EEAS officials, Poland: 61). France, Italy, and the 
UK are reasonably well represented within the study in relation to their share of the 
population of the EEAS, and the same is true for a number of medium-sized and smaller 
MSs (see Appendix 1).  
5
 The 21 officials indicating ‘other’ as their previous affiliation refer either to various 
Commission DGs, not mentioned in the questionnaire, other national authorities (ministries) 
or agencies (e.g. police, development agencies), as well as IOs or research institutions as their 
affiliation of origin. 4 respondents did not disclose their institution of origin. 
6
 Source: EEAS, September 2012, see also: European Parliament (2013), ‘The Organisation 
and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, Challenges and 
Opportunities’, Policy Department, EXPO/B/AFET/2012/07; and idem: ‘Achieving 
Geographical and Gender Balance in the European External Action Service’, see also Duke 
and Lange 2013; and Formuszewiz and Liszcyk (2013),  
6
 All the more, since this assumption is controlled and checked against the ‘staff category’- 
variable, and here the large majority (74 per cent) of the respondents were of the categories 
AD and SNE/SND. However, some AST officials, e.g. in their function as Heads of 
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Administration in EU Delegation, and increasingly (since the Kinnock reform) also a number 
of contractual agents (in function group IV) can be required to assume administrative 
responsibilities, to design, manage, monitor or evaluate programmes, contracts and projects, 
to sit on committees and selection or evaluation panels, draft policy documents and reports of 
diplomatic and political nature, and – if not make – so, at least, to a large extent prepare 
decisions. 
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Appendix 1 
Table A.1 Number of respondents from the survey and interview study, by MS as 
compared to EEAS population 
MS 
Survey 
respondents 
Interview 
partners 
Total 
EEAS population 
(March 2013) 
(By 
category) 
(All) (AD and 
SND) 
 (AD) (AST) 
BE 14 1 15 60 166 
BG - - - 12 4 
CZ 3 1 4 23 11 
DK 2 - 2 23 16 
DE 22 9 31 84 42 
EE 1 2 3 12 8 
IE 2 - 2 22 14 
EL 1 - 1 33 26 
ES 5 1 6 81 41 
FR 12 5 17 12 56 
IT 13 3 16 98 49 
CY - - - 4 1 
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LV 2 - 2 10 3 
LT - 1 1 10 5 
LU - - - 3 - 
HU 4 2 6 21 10 
MT 1 - 1 8 4 
NL 10 1 11 30 25 
AT 8 8 16 28 11 
PL 4 - 4 38 23 
PT 1 - 1 27 28 
RO 2 1 3 13 16 
SI 2 - 2 6 9 
SK 1 1 2 8 4 
FI 5 1 6 22 18 
SE 7 3 10 35 28 
UK 9 4 13 68 31 
Not specified 17 1 (NO) 18 - - 
TOTAL (N) 148 46 194 899 649 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Level and nature of officials’ tasks  
Respondents were asked to choose one or more options from a list describing their main tasks: 
‘political – diplomatic – managerial – administrative – operational – technical’.  The 
assumption is that officials, perceiving their tasks at least partly within the four first categories 
qualify as decision-makers and is thus as part of our analysis, whereas officials perceiving of 
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their own responsibilities as mainly technical or operational are left out from the analysis. 
Where more than one option was ticked, the data was aggregated to give priority to the 
‘higher’ level chosen by the respondents to describe their tasks, assuming that if a position, at 
least partly, includes administrative, managerial or political decision-making routines, it 
should be included in an analysis of ‘decision-making behaviour’.6 54 per cent of the 
surveyed officials find themselves involved in diplomatic and/or political decision-making 
processes and another 40 per cent working mainly at managerial or administrative levels. 
Only 6 per cent of the respondents assessed their tasks as either ‘technical’, ‘operational’ or 
‘other’. The distribution of this self-assessment of officials looks as follows: 
 
Table A.2 Level and nature of main tasks (Mean N= 177) 
 Frequency % Coding Grouped into Aggregated % 
Political 58 33 1 
I 54 
Diplomatic 37 21 2 
Managerial 34 19 3 
II 41 
Administrative 38 22 4 
Operational  6 3 5 
III 4 
Technical  1 1 6 
Key: Based on self-assessment of primary allocation of responsibilities:  
I = (1) ‘at least partly political’, and/or (2) ‘at least partly diplomatic’.  
II = (3) ‘at least partly managerial’ and/or (4) ‘at least partly administrative’.  
III = mainly (5) ‘technical’ and/or (6) ‘operational’ (not seen as decision-makers); 
 
